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Now I observe that when we are met together in the Assembly,
and the matter at hand relates to building, the builders are
summoned as advisersj when the question is one ofshipbuild
ing, then the shipwrightsj and the like ofother arts which they
think capable ofbeing taught and learned. And if some person
offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to be
an expert craftsman, even though he be good-looking and rich
and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh and hoot at
him ... . But when the question concerns an affair ofstate, then
everybody is free to get up and give advice. (Plato 17)
Peter Evans, attorney and all-around good guYi returned to his apart
ment in Los Angeles after identifying a billionaire client's dead body.
He was exhausted. In the past week, he had been stricken by frostbite
in the Antarctic, attacked by man-made lightning storms in Arizona
and California, swept up in a flash flood, suspected ofmurder, and
nearly fired from his firm. All he wanted was a shower and a little rest,
but he was instead conked on the head and dragged into the living
room by three masked men who pinned him down and placed a very
small, very angryj very poisonous Australian octopus under his arm.
Within minutes, he lay paralyzed, his mind racing, convinced that his
life was about to end (Crichton 241-432). But unknown to Evans, he
could not die, not at least within the pages ofMichael Crichton's 2004
techno-thriller State ofFear, for what good is a science fiction novel
with a dead hero?
Crichton's fourteenth novel contains all ofthe essential elements
that would catapult it onto the bestseller list: fast-paced action, a cast

of attractive and intelligent heroes and heroines, and truly villainous
evil-doers who need to be thwarted by the intrepid Evans. But it also
contains a surplus of surprises, such as footnotes, graphs, an "author's
message," a twenty-one page annotated bibliography, and an essay
titled "Why Politicized Science Is Dangerous:· Why would Crichton
embellish his novel with theoretical scientific claims supported by
research and presented with the apparatus ofscholarship? Crichton's
not-so-subtle attempts to show the "fact" behind his fiction is required
because his antagonists are well-meaning environmentalists and his
message is that global warming is a conspiracy perpetrated by the
"politico-legal-merua complex." The aura of scholarship Crichton cre
ates is anticipated by historian Richard Hofstadter, who points out the
tendency ofpolitical paranoids to use the mechanics of scholarship in
marshaling cases whose fanciful conclusions do not satisfy the rigorous
norms of scholarship (35-37). Therefore, one might expect Evans to
provide such arguments and evidence. But, in this case, it is not Crich
ton's hero who is substantiating his conclusions, but Crichton himself
Few read Crichton's book as anything other than a work of science
fictionj however, the attention the novel received positioned Crichton
to become the subject of a heated debate about scientific expertise.
Alan Miller, in his review ofthe book for Issues in Science and Technol
ogy, notes that State ofFear made it to bookstore shelves just months
after the debut of The Day After Tomorrow, a movie depicting the
potential impacts of abrupt climate change: "The film generated a few
fundraising events for environmental groups, but there was little if any
effort to present The Day After Tomorrow as a serious scientific state
ment. In contrast, Crichton has been treated as if he actually possessed
a deep understanding of climate science" (94). Crichton's success as a
science fiction writer garnered him speaking invitations at a number of
unlikely places: he was the subject of a 20/20 news segment, an inter
viewed guest of Charlie Rose on PBS, a featured speaker at the Ameri
can Enterprise Institute and California Institute of Technology, and,
perhaps most surprising, a witness before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works in 2005, for which the committee

chairperson, Senator James Inhofe (R-0K), made the novel required
reading (Janofsky 94). Members ofthe Committee on Environment
and Public Works were divided in their assessments of Crichton's abil
ity to testify about real scientific issues and processes, but the media
spectacle surrounding Crichton's work provided the potential for
broad political and public influence. Sam Leith of The Daily Telegraph
notes: "Michael Crichton will do more to popularize contrarian views
of ecology than Bj0rn Lomborg, as a popular scientist, could ever
manage" (7). Crichton, a licensed but non-practicing medical doctor
turned successful science fiction writer, was thus transformed into an
expert voice of scientific skepticism.
Crichton's global climate change testimony and the discourse
surrounding it serves as an important case study concerning the nar
rative construction ofscientific expertise. More specifically, Crichton
engaged in what science studies scholar Thomas F. Gieryn has called
rhetorical "boundary-work" ( Gierynj Gieryn, Bevins, and Zehr). By
positioning himself as a celebrity science writer with knowledge of
scientific principles and methods by virtue ofhis medical training, a
position he advances through the use of narrative, Crichton attempts
to dissociate climate scientists from "real" scientists. Crichton argues
climate scientists are not scientists at all. How Crichton does this is
worthy ofattention because, as public policy scholars Frank Fischer
andJohn Forrester have argued, "As massive environmental problems ,
loom before us, political talk will become more and not less impor
tant" ( 13). Based on the critical role narrative plays in influencing
public understanding of environmental problems, how experts manage
to marshal narratives while speaking about subjects on which they are
not traditionally trained becomes all the more salient for those who
genuinely seek the best outcomes from political hearings and demo
cratic processes (Hajerj Kaplan). This essay provides an overview
ofthe rhetoric ofscience literature informing our analysis, explores
the rhetorical construction of Crichton's testimony, and notes the
implications for scholarly understanding ofthe link between narrative
and boundary-work as well as climate change communication.

Scientific Expertise and the Rhetoric ofBoundary-Work
Philosophers and sociologists ofscience have long debated about the
"problem ofdemarcation" (Taylorj Popper). What counts as science?
And what counts as pseudo-science or non-science? In essence, the
demarcation problem is one concerned with identifying "unique and
essential characteristics ofscience that distinguish it from other kinds
ofintellectual activities" ( Gieryn 781). Gieryn has argued that one way
to conceptualize how scientists separate science from non-science is
accomplished by using "boundary-work." By boundary-work, Gieryn
means scientists' general "attribution ofselected characteristics to
the institution of sci~nce (i.e., to its practitioners, methods, stock of
knowledge, values and work organization) for purposes of construct
ing a social boundary that distinguishes some intellectual activities
as 'non-science"' (782). Scientific boundaries, thus, are rhetorically
constructed and open to ideological debate.
One common issue related to boundary-work involves the notion
of"independentverification'' as an essential component ofthe scientif
ic method. Karl Popper, in The Logic ofScientific Discove1")'J for example,
comments on how philosophers ofscience see verification as one way
oftesting scientific theories: "[l]fthe singular conclusions tum out
to be acceptable, or verified, then the theory has, for the time being,
passed its test" ( 33). Ultimatel)'j Popper argues that falsification, rather
than verification, is the proper criterion of demarcation ( 40). Clearl)'j
the very idea ofindependent verification as an essential component
of the scientific method is a rhetorical and narrative construction.
There is no one, single scientific method, as Feyerabend also notes.
Feyerabend insists on "independent verification" as a key element in
the scientific method is part ofonly one possible scientific/rhetori
cal assemblage. For Feyerabend, "the ev:ents, procedures and results
that constitute the sciences have no common structurej there are no
elements that occur in every scientific investigation" ( 1). However,
this is not to say that appeals to scientific verification have lost their
persuasive potency. As Crichton's testimony illustrates, these rhetorical
constructions are as popular today as ever.

If concepts such as independent verification and scientific method
can be appropriated rhetorically by public policymakers, then us
ing experts and expertise to advance particular causes and values is a
real possibility. On this count, Frederick Frankena's observations are
insightful:
Scientists and technicians are seldom called upon to find or apply
scientific facts to the exclusion of social value judgments. Studies of
technical controversies, particularly environmental controversies, have
demonstrated that experts and expertise are often employed to mask
political choices. Studies have also revealed that, in response, counter
expertise is utilized in an attempt to open the decision-making process.
Indeed, experts and expertise have become a political resource, not
simply the wellspring ofscientific truth or new technology. ( 31)
Boundary-work is one way scientists can and do privilege one view
ofscience over others. When used in deliberative settings, boundary
work likewise serves particular political interests and values. How one
constructs what "counts" as science has far-reaching implications for
important questions ofpublic policy. Boundary-work, and the stories
employed by those engaging in this work, not only help clarify what
is or is not science, but they also help clarify who can and cannot be
considered a scientist.
Crichton's Narrative Critique:
From Writing Science Fiction to Challenging Scientific Method
Invited by well-known climate skeptic Senator James Inhofe (R-OK),
then chair ofthe U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works, Michael Crichton testified before a star-struck audience on
September 28, 2005, and the experience contained elements of the
politically surreal. According to journalist Jamie Wilson, Republican
senators "rushed to shake the author by the hand yesterday as he ar
rived in the oak-paneled committee room" ( 1). Crichton's imposing
physical stature added to the mood as reporters noted his unusual
height with estimates ranging from 6-feet-7-inches to a staggering
"6-foot-9-inchframe" (Wilson 1jJanofskyE1), as ifhis size would

intensify his points. Crichton opponents were also out in full force.
Fliers from the Natural Resources Defense Council noted Crichton
was "more silly than scary," while the Union of Concerned Scientists
claimed Crichton's testimony would not "reflect scientific fact" (Janof
sky El). Although the spectacle surrounding Crichton's appearance
is itself possibly worthy of analysis, his testimony, the stories he told,
holds most narratological relevance.
As is standard practice in Congressional hearings, Crichton cir
culated his prepared documents to committee members well before
speaking. His fidelity to his written words is evident in the way he
chose to deliver the speech: while it appears he attempted to extem
porize slightly, Crichton was tied to his manuscript and presumably
Crichton departed very little from his initial thoughts. The introduc
tion of Crichton's address followed the conventions ofSenate expert
testimony. After thanking the Chair and the members ofthe com
mittee, a seated Crichton quickly set about advancing his argument
concerning "the important subject ofpoliticization ofresearch." From
the outset, Crichton made it dear to his audience that he would not be
regurgitating the conspiracy theory fiction found in his newest best
seller. Instead, he wanted to address the importance ofhaving "inde
pendent verification" in science. Surely Crichton realized the reasons
he had been invited to give testimony were potentially at odds with
establishing his credibility as a scientist.
In his testimony, Crichton established himself firmly among phi
losophers of science, explaining how he subscribes to a view ofscience
that relies on the use of a fixed method:
[S] cience is nothing more than a method ofinquiry. The method
says an assertion is valid - and merits universal acceptance - only if
it can be independently verified. The impersonal rigor ofthe method
means it is utterly apolitical. A truth in science is verifiable whether you
are black or white, male or female, old or young. It's verifiable whether
you like the results of a study, or you don't.
The key point in Crichton's opening comments is not about the
existence of a material truth, but in how one creates epistemic claims

using the scientific method. For Crichton, the acid test of scientific
validity is independent verification. According to Crichton's simplified
formulation, it is only through verification that "the scientific method
can transcend politics." However, he also foreshadows his later critique
ofclimate scientists by noting that not adhering to independent veri
fication means science may be "overwhelmed by competing interests:'
But what counts as verification? Crichton realizes the burden he has
created for himself, and offers one possible way ofunderstanding the
scientific method.
Crichton understands that "verification may take several forms:'
However, Crichton tendentiously maintains that the "gold standard" of
verification can be found in the field ofmedicine, an area ofscientific
practice with which he is familiar. This decision to look to medicine as
a means ofunderstanding how science should function allows Crich
ton to narrate his way past a number of rhetorical constraints. First,
this perspectival shift preempted arguments from politicians who were
concerned about Crichton's credentials as a fiction writer. For example,
Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) pointedly noted the committee needed
to "focus on facts, not fiction" (Janofsky E 1). However, Crichton re
jects the boundaries Boxer would establish for his testimony. Crichton
anchors his expertise in medicine, a field where his credentials would
be difficult to challenge given his medical education at Harvard. Thus,
Crichton deflects accusations that he was unqualified to testify about
scientific issues because he made his living as a novelist. Second, Crich
ton's use ofmedicine as a means to understand the scientific method
gave him rhetorical traction with those who were likely to see the field
ofmedicine as a long established scientific discipline. Medical testing,
Crichton argued, is as scientific as a scientific field can be, especially
with its "randomized double-blind study" ofvirtually all subjects
within its purview.
Crichton offered policymakers a telling anecdote that uses medi
cine as a way ofhighlighting what it means to have independent veri
fication in science. In 1991, Crichton was returning on a plane from a
trip to Germany when he encountered a sobbing man. This man was a

doctor involved in a multi-year, multi-million dollar double-blind study
testing the effectiveness of a new drug who "had been sitting in the
Frankfurt airport, innocently chatting with another man, when they
discovered to their mutual horror they [were] on two different teams
studying the same drug. They were required to report their encounter
to the FDA:' The story illustrated dramatically the "gold standard" of
independent verification. Should there be any chance ofcontamination
in the study, the contamination should be immediately reported and
the study considered invalid because this is what it means to live up to
a high "degree ofrigor in research:' Here was a convincing example
what Kenneth Burke calls a "representative anecdote"-ofhow ironic
misfortune should not be permitted to derail sound scientific practice.
Crichton's subsequent attacks against climate scientists were
scathing. He argued that unlike medical researchers, climate scien
tists, especially climate modelers, were prone to make mistakes that
compromised the integrity of the scientific method. Unlike the careful
control in medical research, climate science follows its own methods,
as Crichton posits:
[I]t's permissible for raw data to be "touched; or modified, by
many hands. Gaps in temperature and proxy records are :filled in.
Suspect values are deleted because a scientist deems them erroneous.
A researcher may elect to use parts of existing records, ignoring other
parts ... But the fact that the data has been modified in so many ways
inevitably raises the question ofwhether the results of a given study are
wholly or partially caused by the modifications themselves.
In other words, Crichton summarizes, "What is at issue is whether
the methodology of climate science is sufficiently rigorous to yield a
reliable result:' Could climate scientists say their methods meet the
rigorous standards ofindependent verification, given all ofthe manipu
lation and tampering? For Crichton, the answer was a resounding
"no:' However, to support this interpretation Crichton needed toil
lustrate that climate scientists were guilty of"touching" their data. He
needed to make climate scientists appear as bungling incompetents in
his narrative.

Crichton was not the only person making news by arguing against
the faith many had about the status of climate change science. Only
two years earlier the well-known "hockey-stick" graph of climate tem
peratures was also being extensively reported by journalists. Taking the
hockey-stick study written by Dr. Michael Mann and his colleagues as
a representative anecdote ofscientific rigor in climate change studies,
Crichton argued that climate scientists had often failed to use inde
pendent verification when conducting their research; therefore, later
attempts to replicate the research could not substantiate it:
But real fireworks began when two Canadian researchers, Mcintyre
and McKitrick, attempted to replicate Mann's study. They found grave
errors in the work, which they detailed in 2003: calculation errors, data
used twice, data filled in, and a computer program that generated a
hockeystick out of any data fed to it- even random data. Mann's work
has since been dismissed as "phony" and "rubbish'' by scientists around
the world who subscribe to global warming.
While Crichton's claim that Mann's work has been "dismissed" is
perhaps overstated, his use ofthe controversy provides yet another
powerful indictment against climate scientists. Ultimately, Crichton
argues, organizations such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) accepted Mann's work because the IPCC is "under no
obligation" to perform independent verification.
With Mann's work, however, at least it was possible to argue the
results had been verified, although clearly Crichton disagrees (Besel).
Crichton's critique ofMann's work was pointed, but his harshest criti
cism was directed toward climate modelers. With the use of climate
models, independent verification is virtually impossible, yet climate
models are one of the key tools used by policymakers in making deci
sions on an array ofissues. For Crichton, climate models are scientifi
cally useless:
But if independent verification is the heart of science, what should
policymakers do with research that is unverifiable? For example, the
U.N. Third Assessment Report defines general circulation climate
models as unverifiable. If that's true, are their predictions of any use to

policymakers? Arguably not. Senator Boxer has said we need more sci
ence fact. I agree-but a prediction is never a fact.
With this passage, Crichton's critique ofthe climate change "sci
ence"-not just the politically skewed predictions ofsome doomsday
ers-was complete. After establishing what he believed was the gold
standard of scientific practice, a reliance on independent verification,
Crichton attempted to illustrate where climate change "science" failed
to live up to the scientific community's standard.

Conclusion
Given his constraint~, Crichton cleverly maneuvered his way out of
a potential credibility problem. Crichton did not rely on the fiction
found in his bestseller, nor did he attempt to position himself as a cli
mate change expert, nor did he position himself as someone concerned
with selling novels. Instead, he chose to anchor his narrative critique in
a general understanding ofscientific method supported by his knowl
edge ofmedical practice in anticipation ofwhat he believed audience
members would think ofhis intentions. In other words, Crichton
managed the appearance ofhis intentions, a rhetorical choice similar to
what Lisa Zunshine has noted in her work on "levels ofintentionality:'
Although this inventional decision did not directly lead to the passage
oflegislation, the success ofhis rhetoric allowed Crichton to gain the
praises ofmany senators who were skeptical of climate change studies.
In addition, Crichton remains an important name in contemporary
climate change discussions. In terms of adjusting his rhetoric to his
given situation, Crichton's decisions illustrate why many have viewed
him with a sense ofrespect approaching reverence. However, this is not
to say Crichton's position is the correct one.
Although Crichton should be given credit for his careful narrative
navigation ofpolitically dangerous terrain, we must remember that
boundary-work is a rhetorical process that, to invoke Burke, involves
both selection and deflection (59). For example, while it is true that
Michael Mann and his colleagues were questioned about their sci
entific procedures, one could argue their hockey-stick study held up

surprisingly well (Besel). In 2003, Mann even testified before a House
committee that studies conducted by him and other independent
researchers supported the findings ofthe original1998 study, thus
providing evidence the hockey-stick study was independently verified.
Of course, if Crichton were to mention these alternative readings of the
scientific literature, his narrative would lose what rhetorician Walter
Fisher would call its "sense of coherence" (299).
On a more theoretical level, Crichton's testimony also illustrates
how narrative and boundary-work function together. As a locus of argu
mentation, boundary-work is what Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts
Tyteca would call an "associate/dissociative" strategy (190-91). Where
one rhetorically places a field's boundaries determines who belongs in
the in-group and who does not. However, Crichton's testimony brings
into sharp focus the details ofhow one can dissociate an entire group
ofpeople from the classification of "scientist" through the selective
use ofnarrative. A scientific analogy helps with this explanation. The
narrative logic of Crichton's testimony relies on a structural under
standing ofthe relationship between science as an abstract concept and
its specific practice analogous to the relationship that exists between a
genus and a variety ofspecies. For Crichton, science (genus) must have
independent verification. Medicine is one field (species) that illustrates
this notion. Attacking climate science (species) by noting the ways
it may lack independent verification, Crichton attempts to sever the
associative relationship that connects climate studies to science more
generally. In other words, climate sciences, such as climate modeling,
do not really belong to the genus. By extension, climate scientists are
not really scientists.
Although this case study illuminates the complex relationships
between scientific expertise, narrative, and boundary-work, the
genus-species logic that informs Crichton's boundary-work is not
unique to his testimony. Instead, this rhetorical technique is often
employed within skeptical climate change discourse and other areas of
narrative contestation where one group is told they no longer belong.
Indeed, cases such as game show host Bob Barker testifying about

the Captive Elephant Accident Prevention Act, actor Kevin Costner
testifying about offshore oil spills, and Backstreet Boys band member
Kevin Richardson testifying about mountaintop removal all point to
the ubiquitous nature of celebrity presence in Congressional hear
ings. Given recent celebrity testimonies, it is difficult to disagree with
Neil Postman's sweeping observation that we no longer argue with
propositions exclusively, but instead have come to rely more on "good
looks, celebrities, and commercials" (93) over evidence ofthe scien
tific method. It's no wonder that newspaper accounts of Crichton's
testimony to Congress emphasized his imposing stature-his celebrity
status-more so than the content ofhis objections. According to rhe
torical scholars Christopher R. Darr and Harry C. Strine, at least 400
celebrity witnesses have testified before Senate and House hearings.
Such celebrities potentially bring media focus to hearings that might
otherwise remain obscure, each participant having his or her own
reasons to take the media spotlight with them to dark-paneled hear
ing rooms. As politicians hope that celebrities will publicize hearings,
celebrities hope, in tum, that participation in a Congressional hearing
will impart an air ofgravitas to them or their chosen causes. And, of
course, the appearance ofsomeone such as Crichton gives ample op
portunity for media speculation about the nature ofhis motivations,
which makes the appearance yet more newsworthy. In all, it is theater
at many levels-perhaps even what Guy Debord would call part of"the
society of the spectacle"-both by design and by perception: Crichton
ambiguously speaking disinterestedly on behalf of the public good,
or promoting a new book, or advancing his own celebrity. The uneasy
tension among these interactions and perceptions makes for spectacu
lar performance and teaches a lesson on narrative boundary-work to
the entire nation.
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